<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Posts on Min Chun Chen</title><link>https://www.daedluz.com/posts/</link><description>Recent content in Posts on Min Chun Chen</description><generator>Hugo -- 0.148.2</generator><language>en-us</language><managingEditor>mchen12@umbc.edu (Michael (Min Chun Chen))</managingEditor><webMaster>mchen12@umbc.edu (Michael (Min Chun Chen))</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2025 01:16:16 -0400</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.daedluz.com/posts/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Membership Inference Attack with Cumulative Topological Distance</title><link>https://www.daedluz.com/posts/membership-inference-attack-with-cumulative-topological-distance/</link><pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2025 01:16:16 -0400</pubDate><author>mchen12@umbc.edu (Michael (Min Chun Chen))</author><guid>https://www.daedluz.com/posts/membership-inference-attack-with-cumulative-topological-distance/</guid><description>&lt;h1 id="introduction">Introduction&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>As machine learning models become increasingly powerful and pervasive, concerns about privacy in their deployment have grown. One notable risk comes from &lt;strong>membership inference attacks&lt;/strong>, where an adversary attempts to determine whether a particular data point was used to train a given model. For example, in healthcare, a membership inference attack could reveal if someone participated in a clinical study, threatening patient confidentiality.
This risk motivates my work in this post, where I document my recent experiment investigating the possibility in using cumulative topological distance in membership inference attacks.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>